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Abstract
During the process of selling or leasing a property, a real estate agent may make statements
about the property which later turn out to be false (incorrect). This article examines the
liability of real estate agents in the tort of negligence for the making of false statements.
Cases discussed are Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (1980-
1981) 150 CLR 225, Norris v Sibberas (1989) Aust. Torts Reports 80-288, Richard Ellis
(W.A.) Pty Ltd v Mullins Investments Pty Ltd (in liq) (1995) Aust Torts Reports 81-309
and Rawlinson & Brown Pty Ltd v Witham (1995) Aust Torts Reports 81-341.
Introduction
In the course of selling or leasing a property, a real
estate agent makes statements to the intending purchaser
about the property. Property in this context includes not
only real property, but also those sales of property that
incorporate a business component, for example the sale
or lease of a going concern such as a shop or farm. After
the sale, it may emerge that statements made by the real
estate agent were false (incorrect). If the purchaser
considers that, as a result of the false statement, the
property is worth less than the amount actually paid for
it, the purchaser may seek compensation from the real
estate agent.
Should there be a contract between the real estate agent
and the purchaser, the purchaser may sue in contract. It
is more likely, however, that there is no contract
between the real estate agent and the purchaser, and in
that case the purchaser must turn instead to the tort of
negligence. A tort is a civil wrong in those situations
where the law determines the rights and obligations of
the parties.1
                                                
1 This is in comparison to the law of contract, which may
also be categorised as a civil wrong, but here the parties
themselves have decided upon their mutual rights and
obligations.
Even where there is a contract, suing in tort may be
preferable for a plaintiff purchaser. In contract, the
limitation period2 commences when the contract is
breached, and the resultant damage may not be
immediately obvious. In tort, the limitation period
starts when the damage is discovered. In addition the
assessment of damages may be more advantageous to
the plaintiff purchaser in a tort action.
This article examines the liability of real estate agents in
the tort of negligence, negligent misstatement simply
being a form of negligence. The tort of negligence
concerns those situations where the negligent act of one
party causes damage to another and the law, in certain
circumstances, deems that the loss be shifted from one
to the other. The first part examines negligent
misstatement generally and the second part looks at
some cases involving real estate agents.
                                                
2 This is the period within which a plaintiff must commence
an action. In Western Australia the limitation period for
tort and contract is six years: Limitation Act 1935 (W.A.),
s38.
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Part One - The legal requirement in a
negligent misstatement action
The plaintiff, the purchaser, in a negligent misstatement
action must prove the following:
•  that the defendant, here the real estate agent,
owes the plaintiff a duty of care (the duty of
care);
•  that the defendant has failed to conform to the
required standard of care (the standard of care);
and
•  that there has been material damage to the
plaintiff (damage), caused by the defendant and
which is not too remote.
Duty of care (the legal duty to be careful)
Fleming defines the duty of care as ‘… an obligation,
recognised by law, to avoid conduct fraught with
unreasonable risk of danger to others.’3 The history of
the duty concept shows that the courts have always
envisaged that there must be a closeness between the
parties, a relationship neatly crystallised in Lord Atkin’s
‘neighbour’ speech in Donoghue v Stevenson.4 Lord
Atkin said: ‘You must take reasonable care to avoid acts
or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be
likely to injure your neighbour’.5
Where the ‘damage’ suffered by the plaintiff is personal
injury, or damage to property, the courts generally have
no difficulty in finding that a duty of care exists. In
these cases the nature of the damage demonstrates that
there must have been at least a physical closeness
between the parties at some point. Traditionally,
however, the courts have been reluctant to compensate
for pure economic loss, i.e., where the negligent act
causes no personal injury or damage to property and the
loss is a financial one only. Pure economic loss is often
caused by negligently given advice or information (a
negligent misstatement or a negligent
                                                
3 J. Fleming, The Law of Torts (1998) Sydney, 149.
4 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562.
5 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 580.
misrepresentation). This is the situation that arises when
a real estate agent makes a false statement (the negligent
act) to a purchaser.
The plaintiff in pure economic loss cases may lose the
case on the basis that there is no duty of care owed by
the defendant to that plaintiff because the court decides
that their relationship is not sufficiently close. The
reason for this judicial reluctance to impose a duty of
care is the fear of ‘opening the floodgates’ to all manner
of claims for financial loss.6 This reluctance does not
necessarily extend to the relationship between real estate
agents and purchasers. Some decisions, which will be
examined further below, have found that, in the
circumstances, a duty existed between the parties.7 A
number of judgments in negligence cases against real
estate agents refer to Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v
Parramatta City Council,8 which did not involve a real
estate agent as a party, but did involve the sale of real
property. Reference is made in particular to the
following passage on negligent misstatement in the
judgment:
It would appear to accord with general
principle that a person should be under no
duty to take reasonable care that advice or
information which he gives to another is
correct, unless he knows, or ought to
know, that the other relies on him to take
such reasonable care and may act in
reliance on the advice or information
which he is given, and unless it would be
                                                
6 This is best expressed by Cardozo CJ in respect of the
liability of accountants and auditors to third parties in
Ultramares Corp. v Touche 174 NE 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).
Cardozo CJ refers to ‘… a liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class’.
7 See, for example, Richard Ellis (W.A.) Pty Ltd v Mullins
Investments Pty Ltd (in liq) (1995) Aust Torts Reports
81-319, 62,083; Rawlinson & Brown Pty Ltd v Witham
(1995) Aust Torts Reports 81-341, 62,405-62,406.
8 Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City
Council (1980-1981) 150 CLR 225.
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reasonable for that other person so to rely
and act.9
In Shaddock’s case the High Court found the Parramatta
City Council liable to the plaintiff developer for failing
to advise of road widening plans in existence at the time
of the purchase by the plaintiff of a development
property. The facts of the case were that the plaintiff’s
solicitor had submitted a form to the Council in
application for a certificate under s342AS of the Local
Government Act 1919 (N.S.W.). The form asked
whether there were any road widening proposals
affecting the property, to which the Council made no
response. As it was the usual practice of the Council to
make a notation on the certificate if such proposals did
apply, the solicitor assumed that the property was clear
and the purchase went ahead. The developer sued the
Council, losing at first instance and on appeal to New
South Wales Court of Appeal Division, but won in the
High Court. A total of $173,938 damages were awarded.
This was made up of $133,000 for the difference in price
between the actual value of the property and the price
paid by the developer, an amount of $18,745 for
consequential damage, including, for example, such
items as Council rates, land tax, insurance, stamp duty,
and an interest component of $22,193.
Standard of care (how careful is careful enough?)
This is the negligence part of a negligence action. The
required standard of care expected of a defendant is
reasonable care. Reasonable care is determined by
objective standards:
… in other words, the appropriate
standard is not that which the defendant
could have reached, but rather the standard
                                                
9 Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City
Council (1980-1981) 150 CLR 225, per Gibbs CJ 231.
This passage is quoted in Rawlinson & Brown Pty Ltd v
Witham (1995) Aust Torts Reports 81-341, per Kirby P
62,405 and in Norris v Sibberas (1989) Aust. Torts
Reports 80-288, per Marks J 69,059.
which the law says should have been
reached.10
As Fleming points out, ‘This means that individuals are
often held guilty of legal fault for failing to live up to a
standard which as a matter of fact they cannot meet.’11
In certain instances the law does allow the particular
circumstances of the defendant to be taken into account.
This is relevant in the context because ‘skill’ is one such
circumstance and a real estate agent holds him/herself up
as having a special skill. The skill may relate to
property transactions in general, or to specialised
property transactions such as the sale or lease of
commercial properties or the sale or lease of farming
properties. The defendant real estate agent’s work will be
judged in comparison with the standard of competence
expected of a reasonable real estate agent, or specialist
real estate agent, not how the reasonable person in the
street would have acted, nor what the particular
defendant regards as a reasonable standard.
Expert evidence is called by both sides to illustrate what
is a reasonable standard of competence in that particular
profession or calling. Where there are regulations
governing a profession, whether the regulations are
imposed by the profession itself or by statute, the courts
usually regard these as a minimum standard. Failure to
conform will almost certainly mean the defendant has
not reached the required standard of care. Conformance,
however, does not necessarily mean the defendant has
been careful enough. The same principles apply to
compliance with custom and accepted commercial
standards. The High Court made it clear quite a long
time ago that compliance with accepted standards would
not necessarily exonerate the defendant from liability.12
                                                
10 F. Trindade and P. Cane, The Law of Torts in Australia
(1999) Melbourne, 436.
11 Fleming, supra n., 119.
12 Mercer v Commissioner for Road Transport (1937) 56
CLR 580, 589. For a more recent decision, see also
Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, per Mason CJ,
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Damage
The third element the plaintiff has to prove is that the
plaintiff has suffered damage, i.e. the plaintiff has
suffered material injury caused by the negligent act of
the defendant (causation) and such damage is not too
remote (remoteness). The damage, or material injury,
claimed in negligent misstatement cases involving real
estate agents is most likely to be monetary
compensation to make up the difference between what
the property is actually worth, compared with the price
paid by the plaintiff purchaser.
Causation
Causation requires the plaintiff to show that the
defendant’s negligence - in the present context the false
statement made by the real estate agent - caused, or
materially contributed to, the plaintiff’s loss. This may
be established by using the ‘but for’ test: the question
asked is, ‘Would the plaintiff’s loss have occurred ‘but
for’ the defendant’s negligence?’13 If the loss would have
occurred even if the defendant had not been negligent,
the defendant is not liable.
Remoteness
Where the defendant’s negligence has caused the
plaintiff’s injury, the plaintiff is only compensated
where the damage caused by the defendant was
reasonably foreseeable. Consequences are reasonably
foreseeable if they are the result of the occurrence of a
risk which the reasonable man would describe as ‘real’
(even ‘if remote’) rather than ‘far fetched’.14
Defences
There are two possible defences to a claim in negligence.
The first, voluntary assumption of risk, can be equated
to consent. It is based on the proposition that the
plaintiff has waived his/her rights to complain of the
                                                                            
Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ 483 and 487-
488.
13 EH March v Stramare (1990-1991) 171 CLR 506, per
McHugh J 533-534.
damage suffered, for example injuries resulting from the
normal rough and tumble of contact sports. If the court
finds that voluntary assumption of risk applies, the
plaintiff loses the case.
The second defence, contributory negligence, allows
apportionment of damages. This means that the judge is
able to reduce the damages by however much the
plaintiff is deemed to have contributed to his/her own
injury. Contributory negligence occurs where there is a
failure by the plaintiff to meet the standard of care for
his/her own protection and that failure is a legally
contributing cause together with the defendant’s
negligent act in bringing about the injury. An example
is where injuries in a car accident are worsened by not
wearing a seat belt.
Part Two
This part examines three Australian cases where a
purchaser has sued a real estate agent for negligent
misstatement.
Norris v Sibberas15
The plaintiffs, Mr and Mrs Sibberas, purchased a motel
and milk bar in Bonnie Doon near Mansfield in
Victoria. They had no previous experience in running
any kind of business. The defendants were a real estate
agent, Mrs Norris (Norris), and the company for whom
she worked, John S Bell & Co. At the time of the
purchase the motel and milk bar were nearly new,
having only been in existence for eleven weeks, and
were operating unprofitably. The plaintiffs were aware of
this. The amount of the purchase price apportioned to
goodwill was very low, $16,000 of the total $110,000.
Before the plaintiffs signed the contract documents,
Norris (who said that she had sold many motels and had
owned several herself) made certain representations about
                                                                            
14 Overseas Tankships (UK) v Miller SS Co [1967] 1 AC
617, 643.
15 Norris v Sibberas (1989) Aust. Torts Reports 80-288.
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the business, describing it as a ‘once in a lifetime
opportunity’ and saying ‘once you get going it will be a
gold mine’.16 The plaintiffs also sought the advice of an
accountant on the viability of the business, but signed
the contract before receiving any formal statement from
the accountant. The plaintiffs’ solicitor rang the
accountant just prior to the signing and received some
positive comments that influenced the plaintiffs to go
ahead with the purchase. The plaintiffs ran the
businesses unprofitably for three months, then put them
on the market.
The plaintiffs sued the real estate agent and the
accountant for negligent misstatement. The trial judge
found the real estate agent liable and the accountant not
liable. All parties appealed, but the plaintiffs later
dropped their cross-appeal against the accountant.
The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria
allowed the appeal by the real estate agent. The leading
judgment said that the required degree of proximity is
established by ‘reliance’, and the evidence pointed to the
plaintiffs relying on the advice of the accountant for
matters relating to the financial viability of the
businesses.17 In addition, the comments Norris made
about the business being a ‘gold mine’ were predictive
and, for fulfilment, required effort on the part of the
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were aware of this, and three
months was not time enough to test the potential of the
business. As a result the court found that ‘the plaintiffs
failed to establish that Norris made to them a
misstatement or that, if she owed a relevant duty of care,
she breached it’.18 Leave to appeal to the High Court
was refused.
                                                
16 Norris v Sibberas (1989) Aust. Torts Reports 80-288,
69,054.
17 Norris v Sibberas (1989) Aust. Torts Reports 80-288,
per Marks J 69, 061.
18 Norris v Sibberas (1989) Aust. Torts Reports 80-288,
per Marks J 69, 062.
Richard Ellis (WA) Pty Ltd v Mullins Investments Pty
Ltd (in liq)19
The plaintiff company, Mullins Investments Pty Ltd (in
liq) (Mullins) was the lessee of two offices (the original
offices) on the 6th and 7th floors in Australia Place in
William St, Perth. The defendant company, Richard
Ellis (WA) Pty Ltd (Richard Ellis), a real estate agent
and valuer, was the property manager for Australia
Place. Mullins wished to consolidate the office and was
offered some alternative space on the 6th floor of
Australia Place, occupied at the time by Citibank (the
Citibank space).
During the inspection of the Citibank space, which took
place in September 1987, Mullins made it clear to the
defendant’s representative, Mr Swale (Swale), that there
would be no commitment unless the original offices
were re-let. Mullins sought the advice of Swale on the
prospects of re-letting the original offices and this advice
was provided in a letter dated 21 September 1987. The
critical part of the letter states:
… we would suggest that you proceed
with the commitment on the Citibank
space. As you would appreciate, it will
probably take about 2 months before you
are actually in the Citibank premises, thus
allowing you this period to secure a tenant
                                                
19 Richard Ellis (W.A.) Pty Ltd v Mullins Investments Pty Ltd
(in liq) (1995) Aust Torts Reports 81-319
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for the abovementioned areas. This, we
believe, would give you ample time to
lease the 6th floor although it may take
somewhat longer for the 7th.20
The ‘somewhat longer for the 7th’ was taken to be an
additional month. There was no suggestion that this
advice was negligent in the circumstances. On 24
September 1987 Mullins notified Swale that Mullins
would commence negotiations on sub-leasing the
Citibank space. The stock market crashed on October
19th 1987, resulting in a reduction in demand for
commercial office space. The formal offer to sub-lease
the Citibank space was made by Mullins on 4
November 1987. Mullins proceeded with the move to
the Citibank space in January 1988.
The events of the following two or so years are
complicated, but in essence no tenants were found for
the original offices. Mullins later sued Richard Ellis,
claiming that there was a continuing duty of care with
respect to the advice given by Richard Ellis. Mullins
alleged that as a result Richard Ellis had been negligent
in failing to amend its advice with respect to the
leasability of the original offices after the stock market
crash.
At the trial Richard Ellis conceded that it owed Mullins
a duty to take reasonable care with respect to the advice
given, but the trial judge accepted that the advice was
reasonable at the time.21 The trial judge found for
Mullins, on the basis that the advice had ‘a continuing
effect and operation’.22 The Full Court of the Supreme
Court of WA disagreed, saying there was no reliance by
Mullins on the advice at the time that the formal offer
was made on 4 November. This was because the formal
offer was made when Mullins ‘either knew that neither
                                                
20 Richard Ellis (W.A.) Pty Ltd v Mullins Investments Pty Ltd
(in liq) (1995) Aust Torts Reports 81-309, 62,078.
21 Richard Ellis (W.A.) Pty Ltd v Mullins Investments Pty Ltd
(in liq) (1995) Aust Torts Reports 81-309, 62,083.
floor had been let or did not know whether or not either
of them had been let … in neither case was there any
reliance on the representation’.23
Rawlinson & Brown Pty Ltd v Witham24
The defendant in this case, Rawlinson & Brown Pty Ltd
(Rawlinson), was a stock and station agent in the
Riverina in NSW, and a Mr Owers (Owers) was one of
their representatives. In 1982 Rawlinson was engaged to
sell a farm on which there was a bore that the vendors
told Owers had a capacity of 21 megalitres per day
(mpd). The bore broke down in 1983 and, following
repairs, was given a life expectancy of five years and a
reduced capacity of 13 mpd.
In 1985 the plaintiffs, Mr and Mrs Witham, inspected
the property. They informed Owers that they wished to
purchase a well irrigated property, but said they knew
nothing about bores. Owers told them the bore had a 21
mpd. He said, further, that while the bore itself could
not be inspected because it was too deep, the Withams
could expect many years of trouble free pumping. He
also mentioned that he was aware of two bores in the
area, which were still working after nearly twenty years
of operation. With Owers assistance in drawing up a
farm budget, the Withams worked out that they could
afford the property, providing the bore operated as
Owers had advised it would. The Withams purchased
the property. Later in 1985 the reduced capacity of the
bore became obvious and the repair work carried out on
the bore in 1983 became known to the Withams. The
bore finally broke down permanently in 1988.
The Withams sued the defendant, Rawlinson, alleging
negligent misstatement on the part of the defendant’s
representative, Owers. The defendant argued that even if
the advice was incorrect there had been no negligence as,
                                                                            
22 Richard Ellis (W.A.) Pty Ltd v Mullins Investments Pty Ltd
(in liq) (1995) Aust Torts Reports 81-309, 62,084.
23 Richard Ellis (W.A.) Pty Ltd v Mullins Investments Pty Ltd
(in liq) (1995) Aust Torts Reports 81-309, 62,090.
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with respect to the information about the bore’s
capacity, it had simply passed on information provided
by the vendor. With respect to the life expectancy of the
bore, the defendant argued that this had simply been an
expression of opinion by Owers.
In this case the defendant was found liable both at first
instance and on appeal to the New South Wales Court of
Appeal. In addition to the damages payable (the amount
is not recorded) costs were awarded against the
defendant. The court found that the Withams had relied
on the statements made by Owers about the bore, and
the defendant, through Owers, owed the Withams a duty
of care. Reliance was the critical factor in establishing
that a duty of care existed:
Silence was one thing. But once Mr Owers made
representations to the Withams, it was self evident that
it would be crucial to their decision to proceed or not to
proceed with the purchase.25 Owers had then failed to
exercise the required standard of care by not checking
that the information was correct, or referring the
enquiries to some other person competent to give the
correct answers.26
The difference between this case and the previous two
cases is that the Withams made it clear that their
knowledge of bores was limited, and that they were
relying on the advice given by Owers. In Norris v
Sibberas the advice given by the real estate agent, and
on which the real estate agent had expertise, was
predictive, and the plaintiffs were aware of this. In
addition they also made it clear that for financial advice
they were relying on their accountant. In Richard Ellis v
Mullins Investments the advice was accurate at the time
given, but when the formal offer was made at a later
                                                                            
24 Rawlinson & Brown Pty Ltd v Witham (1995) Aust Torts
Reports 81-341.
25 Rawlinson & Brown Pty Ltd v Witham (1995) Aust Torts
Reports 81-341, per Kirby P 62,407-62,408.
26 Rawlinson & Brown Pty Ltd v Witham (1995) Aust Torts
Reports 81-341, per Kirby P 62,406.
date, the plaintiff was not acting in reliance on the
advice.
Conclusion
Real estate agents should take little comfort from cases
where the agent eventually won. Defending a legal
action is onerous financially even if, in the end, costs
are awarded in favour of the real estate agent. Legal
actions are also long-winded and time consuming. In
Norris v Sibberas the statements complained of took
place in 1983 and the appeal judgment was handed
down in 1989. In Richard Ellis v Mullins the advice
was given in 1987, and the appeal judgment was handed
down in 1995. In Rawlinson & Brown v Witham, where
the real estate agent lost, the negligent misstatement was
made in 1985 and the appeal judgment was handed
down in 1995.
The situation for real estate agents is best summed up
by Kirby P. in Rawlinson & Brown v Witham:
If the agent is silent, protests its lack of
personal expertise or knowledge or
expressly acts as no more than a conduit
of the vendor’s claims, risk of liability in
the agent for negligent misstatement will
be minimised. If, however, the agent
offers personal advice and opinions -
particularly to purchasers who are known
to be ignorant and vulnerable - it cannot
be surprised if the courts hold it to the
accuracy and reasonableness of its
statements. Courts will do so where such
statements help to induce a contract later
found to be based upon false expectations
which were, in part, induced by the
agent’s advice carelessly given.27
                                                
27 Rawlinson & Brown Pty Ltd v Witham (1995) Aust Torts
Reports 81-341, per Kirby P 62,407-62,412.
